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INTRODUCTION
The conduct of Anglo-Soviet trade occurs within a legal framework composed of
various factors, including treaties, trade agreements, unilateral trade policies and
measures employed by both countries, and the substantive law of each state. Official
agreements between the two states have typically been bilateral accords operating
principally to establish a legal structure for trade between the two countries.1 The
modest function of such instruments is to authorize the conduct of trade, leaving to
the market mechanism or, as in the case of the Soviet Union, central planning, the
actual content of the trade. In addition, each government promulgates trade mea-
sures independent of transnational trade agreements and these measures have poten-
tial effects upon Anglo-Soviet commercial relations. For example, Britain enforces a
prohibition of certain strategic goods to the U.S.S.R. and employs an export licensing
system which may affect commerce between the two states.2
Another component of the framework is the substantive law of both states. It is
generally the case in English law that corporations which are agencies of a state under
their respective charters or constitutions are accorded state immunity. The view that
an enterprise can be so constituted as to enjoy the privilege of state immunity was
articulated in the case of Krajina v. Tass Agency,' which will be explored below.
The historical foundation of English practice toward state trading enterprises can be
traced to cases involving the East India Company.4 In early cases in which the
company was sued, courts typically dismissed the actions on the ground of the
sovereign status of the company, despite the fact that it was primarily engaged in
commercial activities. Sovereign action, occurring subsequent to and resulting from
certain commercial arrangements was found, for example, in Nabob of the Carnatic
v. East India Co.5 In that case, the defendant-company had been assigned certain
*B.A. 1968, George Washington University; M.A. 1969, Brown University; J.D. 1973, Duke Univer-
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'See generally Hoya, The Legal Framework of Soviet Foreign Trade, 56 MINN. L. Rrv. 1 ('97').
2 Id. at 28.
' [1949] 2 All E.R. 274.
"See Mann, The Law Governing State Contracts, 21 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. xx (944). The bifurcated
nature of the company is indicated in Gibson v. East India Co., 5 Bing. N.C. 262, 272 (1839): "[T]hc
East India Company have been invested with powers and privileges of a twofold nature, perfectly distinct
from each other; namely, powers to carry on trade as merchants, and (subject only to the prerogative of
the Crown to be exercised by the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India) power to acquire,
and retain, and govern territory, to raise and maintain armed forces by sea and land, and to make peace
or war with the native powers of India."
2 Ves. Jr. 56, 59 (1793). In earlier litigation between the same parties, a demurrer had been sustained
at the pleadings stage. I Ves. Jr. 371 (1791).
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districts in India from which revenues were to be collected by the company as
security for a debt owed to it by the plaintiff. After being restored to financial con-
trol of the districts, plaintiff instituted an action, claiming that the defendant had
received funds in excess of the debt. The court, however, held that the -transactions
arose out of a treaty between two sovereigns and that dismissal of the complaint was
thus warranted. The governmental character of revenue collection may distinguish
Nabob of the Carnatic from cases involving strictly commercial transactions engaged
in by instrumentalities of the state. Indeed, it has been suggested that the umbrella
of state immunity need not extend to all activities of a public corporation.6 Above
all, it appears settled that English law has no firm rule granting total immunity from
English jurisdiction to foreign states.7
The relatively sympathetic attitude toward immunity of state enterprises is perhaps
reinforced by the vitality of such organizations in the United Kingdom. Commercial
activities carried on by governmental bodies have been conceptually divided into
three groups: (i) those conducted by Ministers of the Crown in the exercise of
general executive powers; (2) those entered into by statutory boards or corporations
subject to ministerial control although not necessarily occupying an agency relation-
ship; and (3) those conducted by statutory boards or corporations not under the con-
trol of Ministers but which act as government agents! It seems to be established that
at least as to the latter, the board or corporation will be treated as a private entity
if it is operating for its own benefltf The two previous types of organizations may
properly claim immunity from foreign courts' jurisdiction, at least if the body acted
without intent to create legal obligations, although the absence of such an intent
is not to be presumed.'0
The framework of Anglo-Soviet commercial relations also includes the substantive
law of the Soviet Union. Fundamental to any consideration of bilateral commercial
intercourse is the fact that under Soviet law external trade is a state monopoly.1 In
fact, as in the case of the U.S.S.R., all other Comecon countries employ economic
systems in which the means of production are owned by the state and in which
foreign trade is centrally planned.' 2 State monopolization of foreign commerce was
introduced in the U.S.S.R. by decree in 1918 and was subsequently included in the
Civil Code and the Constitution of i9363'
It should be noted, however, that state monopolization of trade does not normally
0 See S. SUCHARITKUL, STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING AcTIVITIEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 114
(1959).
'Id. at x65.
6 Fawcett, Legal Aspects of State Trading, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 34, 37 (1948).
'Id. at 44.
1
o1d. at 43.
SSUCHARITRUL, supra note 6, at 152. See K. GRZYOWSKI, SOVIET PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
71 (1965); Knapp, The Function, Organization and Activities of Foreign Trade Corporations in the
European Socialist Countries, in THE SouRCES OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 53 (C. Schmittoff ed. 1964).
" See generally Hoya, supra note I, at 2. See also GazyBowsyi, supra note 11, at 72.
"3 Sziszy, State Trading Activities in Hungary, 2o VAND. L. REV. 393, 414 (1967). See GRZYBOWSRI,
supra note ii, at 72.
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entail the actual conduct of trade in the state's sovereign capacity. 4 In practice, Soviet
foreign trade is conducted largely by trade corporations which have separate legal ca-
pacity to make contracts and to become involved in litigation.' In addition, Soviet
trade delegations in various countries represent the Soviet state itself, specifically as
part of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Regarded as part of the Soviet diplomatic
delegation, the trade delegation has broad powers to bind the Soviet state in contracts
abroad. 6 As part of the governmental apparatus, the trade delegation is not an in-
dependent juridical entity; consequently, unless relevant treaties provide to the con-
trary, the trade delegation may successfully invoke the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity.' 7
I
ANGLO-SovIET TRADE AGREEmENTS
Inasmuch as a significant part of the structure of bilateral trade relates to official
governmental agreements, each of the several accords will be discussed in turn.
A. Trade Agreement of i921
The i92i agreement, made in contemplation of a formal peace treaty between
the U.K. and Russia which would regulate future economic and political relations,
purports to provide only a legal framework within which trade can occur.' 8 No com-
mercial commitments are exacted from either contracting party.' The substance
of the agreement provides for the removal of "all obstacles hitherto placed in the
way of the resumption of trade" between the two countries and for non-discriminatory
treatment of such trade "as compared with that carried on with any other foreign
country ...."20 The agreement further provides that each party may designate
4 See Sz,szy, supra note 13, at 415.
"n Hoya, supra note i, at 2. As to Soviet corporations, see generally Hazard, Soviet Government Corpo-
rations, 41 MICH. L. REv. 850 (1943). See also GRzYBowsKI, supra note ii, at 72-80; Knapp, supra note
zx, at 61-69.
" Berman, The Legal Framework of Trade Between Planned and Market Economies: The Soviet-
American Example, 24 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 482, 486 (1959). See generally Knapp, nupra note xx,
at 54-55.
"7 Berman, supra note x6, at 486.
"
8 In addition to establishing a legal framework for trade, however, the agreement's provisions also
relate to post-hostilities concerns, such as clearance of mines from seas adjacent to the parties' coasts
and renewal of exchange of private correspondence through the mails and telegraph under regulations
in existence prior to 19r4. Concern regarding recent political events is evidenced by two conditions to
which the agreement was made subject: (i) that each party refrains from hostile action and from carrying
on official propaganda activities against the other, and (2) that citizens of one party situated within the
territory of the other be permitted to return.
"0 Commitments which are incurred by the contracting parties include granting full faith and credit
to official documents, such as "[p]assports, documents of identity, powers of attorney," of the other
party and agreement to refrain from attachment of "gold, funds, securities or commodities" which do
not belong to the country of destination when such may be exported from one country in payment for
imports from the other party. Trade Agreement Between the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., Mar. 16,
1921, 4 L.N.T.S. 127, 133, 134.
204 L.N.T.S. at 129.
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persons to enter and carry on trade within the other party's territory. Such traders
are to be "exempted from all compulsory services whatsoever .. . ," and are granted
rights of access to communications facilities. The agreement concludes with a recog-
nition "in principle" by both parties of liability to compensate private persons who
have supplied goods or services to the other party.
B. Temporary Commercial Agreement of i93o
Subsequent to the formulation of a treaty of commerce and navigation in 1924,
which remained unratified by the U.K.." the two countries in i93o executed a
temporary commercial accord as an interim step prior to concluding a proposed,
formal Treaty of Commerce and Navigation." The agreement is particularly sig-
nificant in that it provides for establishment of a Soviet trade delegation in the U.K.
and the extension of diplomatic immunity to specified members of the delegation.
Similar to the 1924 instrument, the agreement called for each party to provide all
rights and privileges to the other signatory which were granted to subjects, citizens,
or juridical persons of any other foreign state 3 This most-favored-nation provision,
however, was subject to three exceptions, each of which benefited the U.S.S.R24
Under article 2, there is granted to the Soviets the right to establish a trade delegation
in London having as its objects, among others, "to control, regulate, and carry on
... trade with the United Kingdom for and on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics."'  Given its function as a governmental agency, the trade delegation
would have its responsibilities for transactions concluded by the trade representative
or authorized persons assumed by the Soviet government. This responsibility did
not extend, however, to "acts of State economic organisations which, under the laws
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, are exclusively responsible for their own
acts .... ,,27 Responsibility of the Soviet government for the delegation's activities
appeared somewhat illusory, however, by virtue of article 2, section 6, which provided
that all issues arising out of commercial transactions entered into by the trade delega-
tion were to be determined by courts of the U.K. "in accordance with the laws there-
of."2 Under English law, no action against a sovereign state may be maintained un-
" J. TmscA & R. SLuSSER, THE THEORY, LAw, AND PoLCY OF SOVIET TREATIES 77 (1962).
" Temporary Commercial Agreement Between the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., Apr. 16, 1930,
preamble, ior L.N.T.S. 410 [hereinafter cited as 1930 Temporary Commercial Agreement].
"Id., art. x, ox L.N.T.S. at 410.
"' The provision excepted from its coverage the trade provisions in treaties between the U.S.S.R. and
"[states], the entire territory of which . .. formed in all respects an integral part of the former Russian
Empire or with the continental border [s]tates in Asia;" those rights granted to any third country forming
part of a customs union with the U.S.S.R.; or the privileges accorded to border States "with respect to
local trade between the inhabitants of the frontier zone." Id., art. a, Iol L.N.T.S. at 410-12.
" Id., art. 2, io L.N.T.S. at 412. See generally Comment, The Anglo-Soviet Commercial Agreement,
171 THE LAw TIMES 6o-6i (1931).
me 1930 Temporary Commercial Agreement, art. 2, § 4, IoI L.N.T.S. at 412.
'7 Id., art. 2, IO L.N.T.S. at 412.
'lid., art. 2, § 6, Ioi L.N.T.S. at 412. This seems to be an exception to normal Soviet practice. See
generally GazYBowsKI, supra note it, at 89.
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less the state voluntarily submits to the court's jurisdiction. 9 It is unclear, therefore,
whether the remedial provisions of article 2, section 6, actually granted a remedy not
subject to the condition of voluntary submission by the Soviet government.0 The
remedial provisions of the agreement are complicated further by the "Additional
Protocol" to -the instrument executed on the same day." The Protocol purports to
limit opportunities for the trade delegation to claim immunity granted by article 2,
section 2, to instances other than those "in connexion with any proceedings ... arising
out of commercial transactions entered into in the United Kingdom by the Trade
Delegation ...."" Explicit reference was made to article 2, section 6, a factor tend-
ing to indicate an intent by the parties to expose the delegation to English jurisdiction
in litigation arising out of commercial transactions. Consequently, immunity was
purportedly granted to the delegation as to all functions it was to discharge as out-
lined in article 2, section 3, except to the carrying on of trade between the two
countries.
The Temporary Agreement was short-lived despite its liberal provisions. The
British government denounced the instrument on October 17, 1932, and, pursuant
to article 7,33 the agreement terminated on April i6, 1933. The apparent reason for
the British action was the direct conflict between the trade monopoly of the Soviet
government and the most-favored-nation clause 4 Nevertheless, an accord was
reached during the following year which revived the most-favored-nation treatment
between the two states05 Interestingly, the continuing validity of this subsequent
agreement is subject to some dispute, and the present most-favored-nation treatment
may not be founded upon a binding treaty obligationYa
C. Protocol of Agreement on Questions of Trade and Finance of 1947
An example of a trade accord relating to transfers of specific commodities is
provided by the Protocol of Agreement signed in Moscow on December 27, 1947.
The instrument provided, in part, for the importation of grain by the U.K. and
assurance of a supply of certain railroad supplies from the U.K. to the U.S.S.R.
during 1948. The U.K. also undertook to exercise its powers to ensure that contracts
for delivery of equipment to the Soviets "shall be signed in good time and carried
29 Cf. The "Bulgaria," [x964] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 524 (Admiralty Div.); Mighell v. Sultan of Johore,
[I894] i Q.B. 149, 70 L.T.R. (ns.) 64 (1893).
'0 See Comment, supra note 25, at 6o.
s iox L.N.T.S. 418 (930).
32 Id.
"a Article 7 provides in pertinent part: "The present Agreement . . . shall remain in force until the
coming into force of a commercial treaty between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, subject, however, to the right of either Party at any time to give notice to the other to
terminate the Agreement, which shall then remain in force until the expiration of six months from the
date on which such notice is given." 193o Temporary Commercial Agreement, art. 7, 1ox L.N.T.S. at
4r6.
2 TusKA & SLUSSER, supra note 21, at 328.
9 See Hoya, supra note i, at 24.
'
0 See id.
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out by the prospective dates of delivery specified ... ". ,17 In addition to the matter
of deliveries, each party, "being desirous of extending trade between the two coun-
tries .. . "" agreed to commence negotiations for the purpose of supplying the
U.S.S.R. with specified goods. The agreement also provided that if the value of
Soviet orders placed for equipment did not reach half of the total value of mer-
chandise authorized for sale, the U.S.S.R. would "have the right to reconsider its
undertaking relating to the making available.. ." to the U.K. of a specified quantity
of grain.3" The sepcificity of the agreement is further indicated by article 5, which
governs the financing and method of payments under the contracts, and article 6,
pertaining generally to facilitating the transportation of goods.40
D. Five Year Trade Agreements
Contemporary practices between the two countries are reflected in the first five
year trade agreement signed in Moscow on May 24, 1959.41 The agreement indicates
that an increase in trade between the two countries is anticipated, although no
minimum trade commitments are established. In addition to British imports of
Soviet goods made under the Open General Import License, the British Board
of Trade and the Soviet Trade Delegation are authorized to establish "quotas on an
appropriate basis for the import into the United Kingdom of any Soviet goods not
subject to Open General Import Licence . . . ."I Under the agreement, unlike the
1947 Protocol," the contracting parties do not undertake 'to ensure" deliveries of
commodities, a characteristic typical of contracts between centrally-planned econ-
omies4 However, certain features patterned after the socialist group model of ar-
rangement are present in the instrument, such as the duration for a specified, limited
period; incorporation of a provision calling for fixing of quotas on an annual basis;
and provision for annual meetings of official representatives of the two governments
to review the agreement and to prepare recommendations to one or both of the
parties.4 However, it should be noted that the socialist pattern is not stricdy followed
since the terms for deliveries of goods are left to negotiations between the trading
entities in the two countriesY'
"7 Protocol of Agreement on Questions of Trade and Finance Between the United Kingdom and
the U.S.S.R., Dec. 27, 1947, 9i U.N.T.S. 113, 124-26.
38Id., 91 U.N.T.S. at X26.
"I Id.
4I Id., 91 U.N.T.S. at 128-32.
" Five Year Trade Agreement Between the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., May 24, 959, 374
U.N.T.S. 3o6 [hereinafter cited as Five Year Trade Agreement]. See generally Schmitthoff, Commercial
Treaties and International Trade Transactions in East-West Trade, 20 V"D. L. REv. 355, 366-68 (1967).
"Five Year Trade Agreement, art. 2, 374 U.N.T.S. at 3o6.
"Id., art. 2, § 2, 374 U.N.T.S. at 308.
"See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text. Another point distinguishing the two agreements
was the omission in the 1959 agreement of a most-favored-nation clause found in the agreements of 1930
and 1934.
"'See Schmitthoff, supra note 41, at 368.
"Id. at 367.
"Id. at 368.
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The five year agreement was not perceived as the replacement for the prior com-
prehensive agreement, namely the Temporary Trade Agreement of 1934.s Indeed,
article 8 of the former measure provides that during i96o both parties will begin
negotiations concerning a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation which "will replace
the Temporary Trade Agreement. ' 49 Consequently, the parties apparently intended
that the 1934 accord and the five year agreement remain in effect concurrently. As
a result, despite the omission of a most-favored-nation clause in the x959 accord, the
earlier instrument, which contained such a provision, was arguably sufficient to
continue preferential treatment.
The 1959 agreement, due to expire in 1964, was prolonged for another five year
period by virtue of execution of a protocol in 1964, which continued the agreement's
life until June 30, 1969. Notably, the protocol, as well as the 1959 accord, contained
no termination provision analogous to that contained in article 7 of the 1930
Temporary Agreement, whereby either party could terminate -the agreement after
six months noticeY5°
In 1969, the governments "noting with satisfaction the considerable expansion
of trade"'" between -the Soviet Union and the U.K., entered into a Long-Term Trade
Agreement whereby both governments agreed to "facilitate the exchange of goods and
services . . . , subject to the essential security interests of each country.""2 The pri-
mary means of implementation was an undertaking to encourage and facilitate the
execution of trade agreements between the Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations and
British firms, to work toward eliminating British restrictions on Soviet imports, and
to arrange for the Soviet Trade Delegation and the British Board of Trade to
establish "an appropriate basis for the import . . . of goods not covered by open
licensing arrangements."" In turn, the Soviets "expect[ed]" that the Soviet Foreign
Trade Organizations "will place, on normal commercial conditions, substantial orders
in the United Kingdom for a wide range.. ." of products (emphasis added). The
emphasized language may suggest that in commercial transactions the Soviets would
not invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity in actions brought subsequent to
entering into a trade agreement, although the language could be construed simply
to denote Soviet willingness to make purchases in British markets at market prices.
The agreement, which, interestingly enough, makes no provision for most-
favored-nation treatment, will govern Anglo-Soviet trade relations until December 3,
:975, at which time the accord will be extended on an annual basis automatically,
unless either government gives notice of termination as prescribed by the agreement.
See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
Five Year Trade Agreement, 374 U.N.T.S. at 312.5
oSee note 33 supra and accompanying text.
"
1 Long-Term Trade Agreement Between the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., June 3, 1969, prc-
amble, [1969] Gr. Brit T.S. No. 92 (CMND 4132), reprinted at 8 INTEnNATioNAL LEGAL MATERiALS
1301 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Long-Term Trade Agreement]. Interestingly, there is no provision
for most-favored-nation treatment in the 1964 agreement. See generally Hoya, supra note 1, at 23-24.
Long-Term Trade Agreement, art. X(2), [1969] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 92 (CMND 4132) at 2.
I' Id., art. 3() and (2), [x969] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 92 (CMND 4132) at 2-3.
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British willingness to continue the existing framework of Anglo-Soviet trade seems
somewhat remarkable since the U.K. has perennially suffered from a trade imbalance
with the SovietsY4 Besides the obvious reluctance by Soviet officials to purchase
British goods liberally, another factor contributing to this condition is the Soviet
rule which prevents foreign companies from establishing subsidiaries in the U.S.S.R.
in competition with State enterprises. 5 In contrast, British regulations provide for the
establishment of foreign investments in the U.K., subject to governmental approval
and to certain exchange control regulations. The latter regulations, however, do not
discriminate among U.K. trading partners.5 6
The persisting trade imbalance has been a source of considerable British concern.
Thus, a suggestion was made in the House of Commons that British purchases of
Soviet goods be reduced "unless [the Soviets] demonstrate a measure of reciprocity
towards British manufactured goods."57 In light of this unfavorable trade situation,
British officials pressed the Soviets to institute measures necessary to achieve a closer
balance in trade.5 In addition, certain stop-gap marketing techniques were period-
ically employed by the British to stimulate exports to the U.S.S.R. For example,
in 1966, the Board of Trade rendered "extensive support" to the British Industrial
Fair held in Moscow, an event which the President of the Board of Trade charac-
terized as having "attracted immense interest."5 Secondly, pursuant to suggestions
in the House of Commons, the list of goods restricted from sale to the Soviets was
kept under "constant review" to ensure discontinuation of a specific restriction when
strategic considerations no longer demanded its existence. 0
Presumably, the "necessary measures" warranting Soviet adoption would sim-
ply entail governmental decisions to expand purchases of British goods. In this
regard, in 1964, then Secretary Heath expressly requested the Soviet Minister for
Foreign Trade to increase the scale of Russian purchases. In his reply to Mr.
Heath's request, "Mr. Patolichev confirmed that the competent Soviet authorities
would act in accordance with [the] request."6 Despite this assurance, subsequent
"
4The trade imbalance is reflected by the following figures for two distinct periods, 1969-1972, and
1963-x965. The figures are found in various volumes of PARLIAMENT DEBATES, HOUSE OF COMMONS.
IMPORTS EXPORTS
(from U.S.S.R.) (to U.S.S.R.)
1963 X 96.8 million £ 55.6 million
1964 X 97.0 million £ 38.0 million
1965 X 1i8.9 million £ 45.5 million
1969 £ 196.2 million £ 95.5 million
1970 £ 210.0 million £ 102.0 million
1971 £ 205.0 million £ 89.o million
8iz Pm.m. DEB., H.C. (5 th ser.) 296 (1971) (written answers).
8' Boo Par.L. DEB., H.C. (5 th ser.) 200 (1970) (written answers).
5 745 PArL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 16oo (x967).
as 718 PAn.i. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) X222-23 (1965).
59 732 PAR.. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 325-26 (x966).
'a 699 PAuu. DEB., H.C. ( 5th ser.) 672 (1964).
e'Id. at 672-73.
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trade figures belie any conclusion that the Soviets are pursuing a policy designed to
achieve a trade balance with the U.K."2
II
STATE TRADING AcTIvIEs AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
Traditionally, British courts extended diplomatic immunity to diplomats engaged
peripherally in private commercial activities. It is not unusual, therefore, that foreign
state agencies appear to have been exempt from local jurisdiction even with respect
to commercial activities. However, an early exception to this trend insofar as Anglo-
Soviet trade is concerned arose under the 1921 Trade Agreement between the British
and Soviet governments. The case of Fenton Textile Association v. Krassin03 involved
a suit against the head of the Russian trade delegation in England to obtain the
balance of an amount owed for certain goods sold. The trade accord had been
executed prior to de jure recognition of the Soviet government by the U.K., and,
accordingly, by its terms did not extend diplomatic immunity to the trade delega-
tion. 4 Nevertheless, the defendant applied to set aside service of process on the
ground that he was the authorized representative of a foreign state and thus entitled
to immunity. The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's contention on two
grounds, first, that the defendant had not been recognized by the British government
in any capacity other than that of official agent, and second, that the rights granted to
the trade officials were defined in the agreement, which did not provide for immunity
from civil process.
Although not expressly involving the issue of diplomatic immunity, the case of
Luther v. Sago6 5 raised the question of the extent of "recognition" afforded to the
Russian government by virtue of the presence of Mr. Krassin in England both prior
and subsequent to execution of the 1921 Trade Agreement. The case turned upon
the validity in the English courts of a 1918 decree of the Russian government pur-
porting to expropriate certain' properties, which at the time were owned by a Russian
company, the majority stockholder of which was an English enterprise. Despite the
presence of Krassin in England for the purpose of conducting negotiations which
subsequently culminated in the trade accord, the court held that the decree could
not be recognized as a valid legislative action since Krassin's mere authorized
presence in England could in no manner constitute British recognition of the Russian
government. However, subsequent to execution of the trade agreement, the court
' See note 54 supra.
, 38 T.L.R. 259 (1921).
"
4 The agreement did provide for exemption of the Russian agents from either central or local taxation,
:as well as immunity from search and arrest. For discussion of the legal implications of the 1921 accord,
.see generally Wilson, British Recognition De Facto and De lure of the U.S.S.R., 28 Am. J. INT'L L. 99
'(1934).
"Aksionaimoye Obschestvo A.M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] x K.B. 456, 125 L.T.R. 705,
.37 T.L.R. 282 (1920), rev'd on other grounds [1921] 3 K.B. 532, 125 L.T.R. 710, 37 TJ.,.R. 777 (C.A.
1921).
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reversed its previous position, on the basis of the conclusion of the agreement and
a letter from a British official to the effect that the British government had extended
de facto recognition to the Soviet government. The effect of de facto recognition"'
was to validate retroactively the effect of the decree in 1918.
The result in Luther v. Sagor undermines the logic of the court in Fenton
Textile.17 Since execution of the trade agreement constituted de facto recognition
by the British government, it is arguable that official Soviet representatives there-
after enjoyed traditional diplomatic immunities, which Krassin was claiming in
Fenton Textile, despite the more restricted provisions of the agreement itself. Since
the agreement did not expressly reject the conferring of such immunities, it was, at
the least, plausible that the agreement did not exclude such immunities by implica-
tion, especially since the mutual understanding by the governments of the agree-
ment's effect was apparently that the accord constituted de facto recognition. Con-
sequently, any official representative properly within the territory of the other nation
arguably could invoke diplomatic immunity.
The British courts' attitude toward state trading companies, as distinguished from
business-oriented diplomatic personnel or trade delegations, is reflected in a decision,
strongly relied upon by the court in the landmark decision of Krajina v. The Tass
Agency,68 involving the United States Shipping Board as defendant!' In an
effort to exempt itself from British jurisdiction, the Board, a department of the
United States government engaged in ordinary commercial shipping, had filed a
certificate from the United States' ambassador and an affidavit of the defendant's
legal advisor purporting -to define the legal status of defendant as a department of
the government and hence not an independent legal entity. The Court of Appeal,
per Bankes, LJ., allowed the defendant's application, and the action was stayed. The
court minimized the relevance of the fact that the particular ship involved was
engaged in private trading since the plaintiff attempted to have the court obtain in
personam jurisdiction over a "body representing a sovereign State."" Consequently,
it is manifest that an organization or department of government does not necessarily
lose its status of immunity upon engaging in functions properly categorized as
private and commercial in nature. This approach appears contrary to that employed
earlier in the East India Company cases, in which the courts ostensibly attempted
to determine, in light of the company's dual nature, whether the conduct engaged in
related to the commercial or sovereign functions of the enterprise. However, the
difference in approach appears less dramatic when it is recognized that the earlier
cases did not involve exclusively transnational institutions. Since the East India
o Recognition was deemed by the court to have retroactive effect relating back to the establishment of
the Soviet government.
:7 See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
' See note 72 in/ra and accompanying text.
" Compania Mercantil Argentina v. United States Shipping Board, 93 L.J.K.B. (n.s.) 816, 131 L.T.R.
(n.s.) 388 (C.A. 1924).
70 93 L.J.K.B. (n.s.) at 817, 131 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 389. See generally SUCHARITX.L, supra note 6, at
132.
LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEI
Company was a British enterprise, a proper frame of reference existed for the pur-
pose of categorizing the company's activities. However, whether a particular function
is a matter of state or simply a private affair is at least in part a function of the
political system involved.7 1 Consequently, reliance upon statements of government
officials regarding the official nature of the particular enterprise would appear, in the
absence of formal agreements between states governing the subject, an appropriate
dispositive approach.
As suggested above, the landmark decision regarding immunity from suit of a
state enterprise was handed down in 1949 in the case of Krajina v. The Tass
Agency.72 In that case, plaintiff instituted a libel action against defendant, which
published a weeldy newspaper in the U.K. Tass, after entering a conditional appear-
ance, applied to set aside plaintiff's writ on the ground that it was a department of
the Soviet government entitled to immunity from suit. As in the case of United
States Shipping Board, an ambassadorial intervention occurred; the Soviet am-
bassador certified that the agency constituted a department, although it was em-
powered to exercise the rights of a legal entity. The Court of Appeal allowed dis-
missal of the action, holding that even if Tass was a governmental department
enjoying a separate legal status, it did not automatically follow that it was deprived
of the right to assert sovereign immunity.73
The legal basis of Krajina is somewhat difficult to explain for two reasons.
First, as mentioned above, Tass was granted a separate juridical existence, although
the statute establishing Tass described it as "the central information organ of the
U.S.S.R.[,] . . . attached to the Soviet of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. '74
However, another provision of the same statute stated that "the telegraphic agency
of the U.S.S.R. and the telegraphic agencies of the Union Republics enjoy all the
rights of a juridical person.""5 The plaintiff contended that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is inapplicable since Tass has a separate legal existence from that of the
sovereign and that, therefore, the case was distinguishable from United States
Shipping Board, since in that case the Board was clearly a governmental department
not enjoying a separate juridical status. Secondly, Tass on two occasions registered
in the U.K. under the Registration of Business Names Act, first as the agent of a
"foreign firm," and secondly, as an individual doing business in the United Kingdom.
The statute purported to regulate the conduct of domestic or foreign "business" enter-
prises (emphasis added), rather than governmental departments. Consequently, the
plaintiff argued that by registering under the statute, Tass "has said that it is either
a Russian firm or a Russian corporate entity .... "76
Despite the inferences which could reasonably have been drawn from Tass'
' SucAmxu.ym, supra note 6, at X04.
72 [1949 2 All E.R. 274-
I id. at 28o.
7 I1d. at 276.
I d. at 277.
70 1d. at 278.
ANGLO-SovIET TRADE 459
registration, an action which would appear appropriate since the enterprise was
engaged in the publication of a newspaper which was "widely distributed,"7 7 the
court refrained from inferring that Tass, by virtue of registering, was not for pur-
poses of being sued a department of government. Nor did the court find it necessary
to rely on the nature of Tass' activities in the U.K. to rebut inferences that it con-
stituted a commercial enterprise. For example, only casual reference was made to the
fact that the publication involved, The Soviet Monitor, was distributed free of
charge to recipients,7 a factor tending to indicate discharge of the governmental
function of providing information or propagandizing.
On the contrary, the court indicated that the "nature of Tass," and consequently
the outcome in the case, depended upon the organization's charter or constitution,
thereby necessitating resort to "Russian statutes and to any relevant evidence that
is adduced as to Russian law . . . to determine whether or not Tass is a separate
legal entity. '79 It determined that in addition to the statute previously discussed s°
"relevant evidence" included the ambassador's statement to the effect that Tass was
a department of government which exercises the rights of a legal entity. This state-
ment, potentially damaging to Tass, was also deemphasized by the court. The mere
statement by the ambassador that the agency is a juridical entity was simply deemed
not to be conclusive. Consequently, contrary to the court's assertion that United
States Shipping Board was being followed, it is clear that the decision did not rigor-
ously apply the rationale of that decision, since in that case the ambassador's affidavit
was considered dispositive of the question of the Board's juridical status. In Krajina,
on the other hand, the court felt unjustified in treating the ambassador's statement
as conclusive. Furthermore, even if it were determined that Tass enjoyed a distinct
juridical status, the court noted that such would not necessarily result in depriving
Tass of its immunity. The critical consideration is whether a court can conclude
that a sovereign has intended to relinquish immunity.
Prior to Krajina, it had been established that the nature of activities engaged in
by a governmental authority was not conclusive for the immunity question. The
Parlement Beige81 and The Porto Alexandres2 held that the fact that trading ac-
tivities are engaged in is an insufficient basis to deprive a government agency of its
claim to immunity. Consequently, in Krajina, the lack of importance attributed to
Tass' registration in the Business Names Register appears less significant in light of
this decisional law background. The primary significance of the case seems rather
to lie in the modification of the Shipping Board rationale and in the attachment of
a strong presumption of sovereign immunity to a government agency unless the
intent of the sovereign authority to relinquish its presumed immunity is established83
' Id. at 277.
s Id.
I d. at 279.80See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
S15 P.D. x97 (C.A. i88o).
"' (1920] P. 30 (C.A. i919).
'3 But see Sucum-RnuL, supra note 6, at x65.
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Subsequent to the court's decision in Krajina, brief debate with respect to the
case was heard in the House of Commons. In this regard, Mr. Wilson Harris in-
quired whether the government was considering amendment of the immunity law
in such cases. Mr. Harris was informed by the Minister of State, Mr. McNeil, that
no action was then contemplated. Clearly, Mr. McNeil was unalarmed by the case,
despite Mr. Harris' fears of proliferation of libelous articles "with complete im-
punity." In turn, Mr. Eric Fletcher inquired whether the Minister concurred in the
view that the law of immunity is "quite out of date in modern conditions in which
States take part in a great many activities ... Mr. McNeil offered no direct
answer.
Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was granted in Krajina, and subsequently,
Lord Vansittart moved for Papers.8" Following extended debate, however, Lord
Vansittart withdrew his motion8 6 The tone of the debate in the House of Lords
indicates disenchantment with the particular result of the doctrine of state im-
munity, namely a remediless victim of libel, rather than a fundamental disagreement
with the doctrine itself.
Without attempting a direct change in the law, but to respond to a subsequent
libelous publication in the Soviet Monitor, the British government "addressed
to the Soviet Embassy requesting an assurance that if, in future, a dispute should
arise between a private person ... and the Tass Agency ... [the agency] would, as a
condition of continuing to operate in this country, either waive their immunity from
suit or submit to arbitration.""7 The Soviets refused and temporarily ceased publica-
tion.
Despite the temporary alarm generated by Krajina, significant legal changes were
not forthcoming, except with respect to diplomatic agents in 1964. As to the law of
diplomatic immunity, adoption of the 1964 Diplomatic Privileges Act operated to
eliminate the immunity defense as to diplomatic agents engaging in "an action
relating to any professional or commercial activity . . . outside his official func-
tions."'8 This enactment modifies existing case law, which extended the immunity
shield to diplomats engaged in private commercial activities. For example, it was
held in The Porto Alexandre that a diplomatic agent "may engage in private
trading, but ... his immunity ... protects him even from proceedings in respect
of his private trading." 89 However, the 1964 Act in no way changed, nor indeed
addressed, the matter of the immunities of the State itself as to State trading
activities.0
The strength of the case law tendency to grant sovereign immunity to state-
84 466 PAre.. DE ., H.C. (5 th ser.) 1764-65 (x949).
x 65 PARL. DEa., H.C. (5th ser.) 926 (1949).8 1d. at 942.
174 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 757-58 (951) (emphasis added).
"The Diplomatic Privileges Act x964, c. 81, art. 31(I) (c). See Buckley, The Effect of the Diplomatic
Privileges Act 1964 in English Law, BRT. Y.B. INT'L L. 321, 338-43 (1965-66).
s [192o] P. at 37.
o Buckley, supra note 88, at 363.
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operated enterprises is also evident in decisions pertaining to state-owned vessels.
A recent case is illustrative in this regard.91 Defendants' vessel, The Bulgaria, was
seized and arrested, upon application by plaintiff. After making a conditional ap-
pearance, defendants offered to obtain bail bond as a condition of release of the
ship, since defendants desired to sail before the court would have had the oppor-
tunity to set aside plaintiff's writ on the grounds of sovereign immunity. However,
defendants were concerned that posting bond would be construed as a voluntary
submission to the court's jurisdiction and, thus, applied for leave to post the bond
with the condition that such action would not prejudice defendants' right to move
that the plaintiff's writ be set aside. The court allowed the defendants to do so,
thereby assuring availability of the sovereign immunity defense.
III
CONRACTS AND CONFLICTS OF LAW
The principle of lex loci contractus is fundamental to English law. As applied
to Anglo-Soviet transactions, the rule was tested in the context of events following
the revolution in Russia in the case of Perry v. Equitable Life Assurance So-
ciety.9" In 19o3, plaintiff took out a life insurance policy with the defendant-
insurer for a specified amount payable at defendant's office in St. Petersburg. By
the terms of the policy, all payments were to be made in Russia. Accordingly, plain-
tiff paid all premiums in Russia until 1917, and thereafter made subsequent pay-
ments in London until 1919. By the terms of an Imperial Decree of 1889, which
were incorporated in the policy, it was provided that all disputes in connection with
insurance operations should be decided according to Russian law and in Russian
courts. After the Bolsheviks seized power, a monopolization decree was issued
in December, 1918, whereby all forms of insurance were made a state monopoly.
A year later, a cancellation decree was issued, abolishing life insurance altogether
and annulling existing contracts. Having been prevented by governmental edicts
from suing on the policy in Russia, plaintiff instituted an action in England for a
judgment declaring that defendant-insurer was liable to him under the policy.
The court found for the defendant on the basis that since the proper law governing
the contract was Russian law, the effect of the decrees of 1918 and 1919 was to
annul the policy.
Also accepting the predominance of Soviet law is Re Banque des Marchands
de Moscou,93 a case arising out of the dissolution and nationalization of a bank
by the Soviet government. Under a decree in December, 1917, the assets and li-
abilities of the bank were taken over by the State Bank. In 1932, a winding-up
order was made in England with respect to the bank, and the court-appointed
liquidator received the bank's assets in England and accepted claims against the
"1 [1964] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 524.
02 45 T.L.R. 468 (1929).
" [1952] i All E.R. 1269.
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assets. Among the claimants was the Royal Exchange Assurance, which sought
to prove that at the time of nationalization it had certain sums deposited in accounts
with the bank in the Soviet Union and had deposited certain securities for safe
custody. 4 Arguing from a corollary of the rule propounded in the case of Re
Russian Bank for Foreign Trade,95 wherein it was held that Soviet nationalization
decrees could not extinguish debts which in English law were regarded as being
locally situated in England, the court extended principles propounded in Princess
Paley Olga v. Weisz,98 and held that the claims of the Royal Exchange Assurance
were governed by Russian law. Applying such law, the court held that the effect
of the nationalization decree was to extinguish Royal's rights against the bank
and that, therefore, there was no existing debt owed by the bank to Royal at the
date of the winding-up order. Any claim by Royal subsequent to the decree could
properly be made only against the State Bank. 7 Further, applying the principle
that "a bailee of goods who has been evicted by title paramount has no longer any
liability under the bailment,"'9 8 the court concluded that the action of the Soviet
government was such that the bank could properly plead that it had been evicted by
tide paramount99 and would therefore be discharged from liability.
Applicability of the law of the jurisdiction appropriate under principles of
conflicts of law is also demonstrated in the case of Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner
& Keeler, Ltd- °° In that case, an East German corporation (Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung)
brought an action against defendants, including the West German Zeiss corporation
(Zeiss-Heidenheim), contending that the latter corporation had used plaintiff's
name without consent in relation to business and goods. Plaintiff further alleged
that Zeiss-Heidenheim had passed off its goods as those of plaintiff. The Zeiss enter-
prises had traditionally been centered in a district later incorporated within the
East German zone. Upon departure of the Allies from the region in 1945, members
of the enterprise's boards of management were moved to the Western zone, where
Zeiss interests were further developed and expanded. However, continuous man-
agement had existed in the Eastern zone. Subsequent to confiscation and national-
ization of the Zeiss enterprises by Soviet authorities, certain political changes were
instituted by the U.S.S.R. After the Soviets established the German Democratic
Republic (G.D.R.) to govern the areas in Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R., the
G.D.R. abolished the political subdivision under which the Zeiss interests were
organized and created various districts to replace the prior divisions. The governing
body (Council of Gera) of the newly-created district assumed the position of di-
"'Id. at 1271.
[19331 Ch. 745, 102 L.J. Ch. (n.s.) 309, 149 L.T.R. (n.s.) 65.
'6 [1929] i K.B. 78, 98 L.J.K.B. 465, 14 L.T.R. (n.s.) 207. In that case the court held that
English tribunals would not inquire into the validity of acts done by a recognized foreign government affect-
ing its own subjects in respect to property situated in its own territory.
[1952] 1 All E.R. 1274.
Id. at 1275. Accord, Ross v. Edwards & Co., 73 L.T.R. (n.s.) Xoo (1895).
9' [1952] I All E.R. 1276.
- [s967] i A.C. 853 (1966).
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rectors of the Zeiss interests. In litigation in i961, the Supreme Court in East
Germany concluded that Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung continued to exist as a legal entity
and that the Council of Gera was its special board. An agent of the board autho-
rized an action to be brought in the English courts against Zeiss-Hiedenheim. De-
fendant contended that the action was being brought without the proper autho-
rization of Zeiss interests, thereby bringing into issue the authority of the Council
of Gera to govern and represent the foundation and to authorize English solicitors
to bring a passing-off action in the name of Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung. The issue of the
Council's authority, interestingly, had been litigated in the Federal High Court in
West Germany, which held that Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung was not properly before it
inasmuch as the Council of Gera had no authority to represent the enterprise.
In 1964, a British official certified to the court that the British government recog-
nized only the U.S.S.R. as sovereign with respect to the Eastern zone of Germany.
The court, in turn, held that the G.D.R. must be regarded as a subordinate or-
ganization acting with the consent of the government of the U.S.S.R. and thereby
deriving authority from the sovereignty of the U.S.S.R.' Since a foreign corpo-
ration is governed by the law of its domicile, the capacity of plaintiff to bring the
action is determined by East German law.10 2 It appeared that East German law
was clearly to the effect that Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung still exists as a "juristic person '1 0 3
and that the Council of Gera was entitled to act as the enterprise's special boardY 4
Consequently, full effect was given to East German law, thereby confirming the
propriety of the action being instituted pursuant to. authorization by the Council of
Gera.
IV
COUNTERCLAIMS
English law governing counterclaims against a sovereign in principle allows
maintenance of such a claim if necessary for purposes of doing justice and if the
counterclaim directly relates to matters connected with the principle claim. The
reticence toward adopting an expansive judicial attitude concerning counterclaims
is reflected in the case of South African Republic v. Transvaal Northern Ry.'0 5 In
that case, an action was brought by the government of the South African Republic
for the appointment of a new trustee of funds generated under a concession to a rail-
road company. The defendant filed a counterclaim for an amount allegedly owed
by the government under the concession. Upon plaintiff's application, the court dis-
missed the counterclaim on the grounds that it was too indirectly related to the
subject matter of the principal action. In accord with the strict principles propounded
.o Id. at 906.
... Id. at 929 (opinion of Hodson, L.J.).
20" Id. at 939 (opinion of Guest, I.J.).
o"Id. at 949 (opinion of Upjohn, L.J.).
05 67 L.J.Ch. (n.s.) 92 (897).
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in Transvaal is Union of Soviet Republics v. Belaiew,10 6 an Anglo-Soviet case relating
to the ownership of certain government documents. The Soviet government in-
stituted a suit to obtain the documents, which dated back to 1916 when the Russian
Government Committee, of which the defendant was a member, was established in
London by the Imperial Russian Government. The committee was continued by the
Russian Provisional Government after the onset of the revolution and actively func-
tioned until 1918. The documents related primarily to financial obligations incurred
by the Government Committee and were legally the property of the governments.
Upon the committee's termination, the documents were tendered to a special board
of trustees, appointed by the charge d'aflaires of the Russian Provisional Govern-
ment, of which board defendant became president. Upon institution of the suit,
defendant set up a contention by counterclaim that he was entitled to a lien on the
documents until he had received indemnification by the Soviet government with
respect to actions pending against defendant arising out of the matters to which the
documents related. The court dismissed the counterclaim, although it reiterated the
principle that such a claim can be maintained against a plaintiff-sovereign if the
counterclaim is confined to matters immediately connected with the principal claim.
The reason for dismissal was that the indemnity claimed by the defendant was not
in respect to any liability incurred by him qua custodian of the documents, even
though the claims against defendant arose in connection with matters pertaining to
the documents.
CONCLUSION
The future of Anglo-Soviet trade is largely a matter of conjecture. The discernible
pattern governing past and present trade relations is characterized by Soviet willing-
ness to accept a legal framework ordinarily employed in accords between market
economy countries,"' as evidenced by the bilateral agreements beginning in 1921,
with the inclusion of certain formalities customarily found in trade agreements
between socialist countries. The explanation for Soviet flexibility may lie in part in
the generous attitude of English law toward state trading and in the comparative
advantage obtained by virtue of most-favored-nation arrangements. Whether a
change in English law or policy restricting either of these factors would lead to
alteration of the legal structure of commercial relations must remain a matter of
speculation.
10 134 L.T.R. (n.s.) 64, 42 T.L.R. 21 (1925).
"' See Hoya, supra note i, at 45.
